Economic theory by Nielsen, Klaus
Economic theory 
 
 
Governance and coordination in economic theory 
 
The subject matter of economics is the study of how individuals, firms and governments make 
choices. The overall purpose is to guide society in relation to the effective allocation of scarce means 
of production toward the satisfaction of human wants. In other words, the underlying normative 
rationale of economics is to provide guidance as to how a multitude of decisions can be coordinated 
in a way that secures efficiency. Economists tend to give prominence to the effectiveness of market 
processes in this respect and the normative implication of an economic analysis of a specific problem 
is often to set market processes free. However, the effectiveness of the market is premised by a set 
of institutional preconditions such as freedom of enterprise and ensured property rights. In addition, 
economic theory identifies situations where the market mechanism does not function effectively. 
The normative implication is to supplement or complement the market with other mechanisms of 
coordination.  
 
In other words, economic theory is about coordination of decision making. Markets, corporate 
hierarchies and governments are seen as the most important governance mechanisms, and 
economics is about the proper role and scope of each mechanism. Decision making is coordinated by 
means of a proper division of labour between each mechanism. Some tasks are seen as best 
accomplished by the market, others by corporate hierarchies, and others again by the government. 
Some economic theories also stress the importance of proper institutions for effective coordination 
of the decision making. In sum, coordination takes the form of institutional framing and division of 
labour between governance mechanisms that are mostly seen as functioning in isolation and 
according to their own respective rationales. On the other hand, discursive framing of decentralized 
decision making and mixture of governance mechanisms as a result of direct interaction, joint 
decision making and negotiations between actors are beyond the theoretical perspective of 
economics.  
 
Governance is seldom being analysed explicitly in economics. It is even hard to find texts where it is 
used explicitly as a concept. Actually, the concept does not figure at all in the list of contents in the 
most used handbooks, encyclopedia and dictionaries of economics. Even so, economics has 
contributed theories which have been highly influential in the literature of governance if this is 
understood in a generic sense as coordination of social and economic life. The introduction to this 
Handbook outlines a generic and a more narrow definition of governance. The generic definition 
understands governance as the process of steering society and the economy through collective action 
and in accordance with common goals.  This understanding of governance fits well with the focus of 
much economic theory on the coordination of different modes of governance. Economic theories of 
markets, corporate hierarchies and the role of the state provide much of the rationale behind the 
traditional way of understanding the tasks and limits of government. Mainstream economics has 
contributed theories that underpin the rationale of the predominant steering of society and the 
economy through collective action.  
 
However, this does not resonate with the overall approach of this volume as expressed in the 
narrow definition of governance. This definition understands governance as the interactive processes 
through which society and the economy are steered towards collectively negotiated objectives. The 
narrow definition stresses horizontal interactive processes between private and public actors in 
which objectives are negotiated collectively. Whereas such processes are in focus in a few specific 
areas within economics and in contributions from heterodox economic theories they are largely 
ignored in mainstream economic theory.  
 
 
 
One of the metaphors being used for such forms of governance is the handshake. In this 
contribution the handshake will be used as a metaphor to represent contributions with important 
common elements even if only a few of them use the concept themselves.  Instead of coordination 
directed by either the invisible hand of market forces or the visible hand of superiors in hierarchies 
handshakes represent coordination by agreement, bending of will and/or consensus. Handshakes 
can be visible or invisible. Visible handshakes are formal whereas invisible handshakes are informal. 
Visible handshakes are being fleshed out through direct interaction within institutional frameworks 
established for formal coordination and aiming for compromise. Invisible handshakes are informal 
coordination through means such as trust, social relationships, affinity and a common frame of 
meaning aiming for consensus.  
 
Because of the important role of mainstream economics in relation to the traditional forms of 
coordination this contribution starts off by specifying in more detail how mainstream economic 
theory has contributed to this traditional understanding. First, the rationale of the invisible hand 
with no need for interactive coordination is presented. The economic rationale of the diametrically 
opposite approach in the form of central state planning (the clinched fist) is presented next. Then 
follows an outline of micro- and macroeconomic theories that suggest the need for supplementing 
the invisible hand with a helping hand in order to counteract market failure, stabilize the macro 
economy and redistribute income. Then the focus shifts to the governance of the firm starting with 
the visible hand of managerial coordination followed by economizing on transaction costs, and the 
trends of globalization and outsourcing (the vanishing hand). Whereas the preceding sections 
concern theories with a focus on coordination of governance mechanisms in accordance with the 
generic definition of governance, the concluding sections give a more detailed account of economic 
theories that contribute important insight to the understanding of governance more narrowly 
understood as societal steering toward collectively negotiated objectives though interactive 
processes. A review of contributions that provide an economic theoretical  rationale for formal 
interaction between market actors, governments and  associations (visible handshakes) is presented 
first, followed by an outline of contributions about informal coordination in networks, by means of 
social capital and through discursive interaction (invisible handshakes).  Finally, economic theory of 
the governance of common pool resources is presented as a combination of visible and invisible 
handshakes followed by a conclusion. 
 
 
The invisible hand 
 
Governance as it is understood in the more narrow definition in this book was out of focus in 
mainstream economic theory from its very inception.  Often, the contribution of Adam Smith is seen 
as the starting point of modern economics. Even if Smith only used the phrase a few times and in 
more specific contexts (Slater and Tonkiss, 2001), the invisible, or hidden, hand has since been 
generalized and interpreted as a powerful metaphor for his economic theory. 
 
The idea that trade and market exchange automatically channels self-interest toward socially 
desirable ends, as if led by an invisible hand, is the foundational idea of modern mainstream 
economics. The invisible hand of the market coordinates the activities of atomistic actors who are 
assumed to make decisions in splendid isolation. Even if everybody acts only in their own interest in 
total disregard of their fellow human beings and of the overall impact of their behaviour, the 
wonders of the market will ensure the best possible societal outcome. This is the classical rationale 
of economic theory:  the best possible allocation of resources will be the unintended outcome of a 
multitude of uncoordinated self-interested decisions by consumers and producers. There is a direct 
line from Adam Smith through the marginal theory of value and modern general equilibrium theory 
to current neoclassical orthodoxy. In spite of the evidence of grand scale market failure, 
development and poverty traps, and economic and financial crises, the assumed superiority of the 
unregulated market as allocation mechanism is a constant in mainstream economic theory.  The 
ideal market with an effective invisible hand provides a central justification for laissez faire 
economics. There is no positive role for direct interaction between actors which may interfere with 
the efficient functioning of the invisible hand. 
 
Adam Smith was a proponent for limited government and his economic theory is closely linked to 
classical political liberalism. However, he stressed that government provision of the fundamental 
framework for free markets was crucial. He also pointed at the necessity of other form of 
intervention in the market such as raising wages of the poor, supporting infant industries and tariffs 
under certain conditions. However, the most distinct divergence from laissez fair follows from his 
clear diagnosis of the failure of the invisible hand in case of collusion of market actors in order to 
manipulate prices and restrict supply. Smith's epic work The Wealth of Nations (1776) is a radical 
condemnation of business monopolies sustained and protected by the state which legitimizes 
countervailing action to secure an optimal outcome for society in terms of allocation of resources..  
   
The invisible hand has had a huge influence on the thinking of all mainstream economists since 
Adam Smith. The central disagreement between economic ideologies can be viewed as 
disagreement as far as the strength of the ‘invisible hand’ is concerned. Phenomena such as large-
scale industry, finance, and advertising were only nascent when Smith was alive, and some 
mainstream economists argue that this seriously decreases the effectiveness of the invisible hand. 
Some economists even argue that the reason why the invisible hand often seems invisible is that it is 
often not there (Stiglitz, 2003). Such views provide a rationale for coordination mechanisms different 
from the invisible hand.  
 
 
The clinched fist 
 
Neoclassical economics has certainly been the predominant paradigm in the last century. However, 
alternative competing paradigms have always co-existed with the dominant one. Until the 1990s the 
one with the strongest following was Marxist economics which provides an alternative approach 
which is totally incompatible with mainstream economics with its emphasis on accumulation, 
exploitation and class struggle. Marxist economics has various strands and leads by no means to 
unified policy prescriptions. However, alternative modes of coordination of economic and social life 
were definitely nurtured by its fundamental critique of capitalism, and in communist regimes central 
planning was seen as the alternative.  
 
In the conceptual context of this chapter the mode of governing economic behaviour and relations 
in communist regime can be seen as a clinched fist. The power of state is unlimited as an instrument 
for the will of the people, or at least the proletariat, as represented and defined by the Communist 
Party, in its efforts to allocate resources and distribute proceeds in accordance with socialist 
principles. In this context, central planning is as dominant as the market in the ideal laissez faire 
economy. Economic theories inspired by Marxism guided the planners in their authoritative 
decisions about resource allocation and price setting (Kantorovich, 1939). The decisions of the 
planners worked as a clinched fist. No alternatives and no opposition were permitted.  
 
The clinched fist worked well in periods when mobilization of resources for industrialization, war, or 
reconstruction was of utmost importance. Later, when concerns shifted to efficiency in production 
and satisfaction of varied consumer needs the limits of the clinched fist became obvious. Marxist 
economists developed proposals for market socialism (Lange, 1936). The intention of the 
subsequent market socialist reforms was to establish incentives for efficiency improving economic 
behaviour within the framework of a planned economy. However, the reforms did not achieve their 
objectives and other Marxist economists criticized the emergent bargaining structure where 
powerful state enterprises were able to extract disproportional resources from the state. 
Consequently, a highly inefficient ‘economics of shortage’ dominated by ‘soft budget constraints’ 
emerged (Kornai , 1980). In other words, the efforts to integrate markets in the planning model 
resulted in interactive processes of steering toward collectively negotiated objectives, in effect, 
governance in accordance with the narrow definition. However, the allocative outcome was highly 
inefficient and the policy impact was a worsening of power inequality.   
 
 
The helping hand 
 
Economic theories stress both the wonders of the (ideal) market mechanism and the multitude of 
market failures in practice. The failure of the market in allocating resources optimally, steering the 
macro economy and distributing income fairly makes it necessary to help the invisible hand by 
means of other governance mechanisms. Microeconomic theory points at a number of market 
failures. Following in the footsteps of Adam Smith, monopoly or more broadly economic power are 
seen to restrict supply and raise prices. In addition, externalities, public goods and information 
problems also result in suboptimal allocation of resources which all require correction by a helping 
hand.  Further, the contribution of Keynes established macroeconomics as a separate field of study. 
He challenged the belief in the healing powers of the invisible hand by stressing the inability of the 
market to create full employment and the need for a helping hand in the form of demand 
management by the state. In addition, the distributive outcome of the market process is the blind 
spot in mainstream economic theory which addresses efficiency concerns but has nothing to 
contribute in relation to fairness of distribution. If distribution is considered unfairly unequal, a 
helping hand is needed here as well.  
 
The need for a helping hand to correct the failures of the invisible hand of the market has 
traditionally resulted in a call for government intervention. Economic theory provides guidance as 
far as not only the need but also the form and scale of such intervention. Microeconomic theories of 
industrial regulation (Sugden, 1993) and macroeconomic theories of income formation and 
economic policy (Snowdon and Vane, 2002) show how the state can counteract the inefficient and 
unjust outcome of the invisible hand. This is a way of governing the economy by means of 
supplementing or complementing markets through government intervention.  
 
The increasing role of the helping hand resulted in the emergence of a mixed economy (Schiller, 
2010, 15) characterized by private ownership of the means of production and the dominance of 
markets for economic coordination but also indirect influence of the government over the economy 
through regulatory oversight, governmental provision of public goods and macroeconomic steering. 
Mostly, no need for direct interaction and coordination was envisaged. Market processes and 
government activities were seen as two isolated domains to be coordinated through a suitable 
division of labour. However, some mixed economies expanded in scope to include a role for 
indicative economic planning (see later) and large public enterprises which represent handshakes 
and direct government market interference respectively.  
 
The prevailing economic theories stressing the need for a helping hand led to state intervention 
across the board and generally legitimized the growth of the state from the end of WW II until the 
1970s. However, this orthodoxy was not unchallenged. Friedrich Hayek stressed the incapability and 
undesirability of what he called the collectivist rationalism of government interventionism. Milton 
Friedman developed a thorough criticism of Keynesian macroeconomics and recipes for alternative 
economic policies. From the 1970s and onwards such heresy on the fringes was brought into the 
mainstream of economic theory as the prevailing theories of the helping hand crumbled. The 
resulting neoliberal challenge questioned not only the efficiency but also the necessity of 
government intervention (Nielsen, 1991).  
 
Microeconomic regulation of industry was seen as inefficient because of government failure. 
Bureaucrats lack not only the capacity but also the incentives for regulating in accordance with the 
prescriptions of the helping hand. Public choice theory show how regulation fails because of the self-
interested behaviour of politicians and bureaucrats (Tullock, 1987). Economic theory was applied in 
an attempt to better understand policy making and implementation which had previously been 
assumed to be automatically efficient responses to the need for microeconomic public intervention 
prescribed by economic theory.  Macroeconomic steering was seen as similarly inefficient as a result 
of inherent failures in relation to targeting, implementing and timing of macroeconomic policies, in 
particular fiscal policies which were considered central in the Keynesian repertoire of policy 
intervention (Mankiw, 2013). Further, redistributive policies to counteract unwanted distributive 
outcomes were seen as having negative impacts on efficiency. Especially, the assumed neutrality of 
redistribution in relation to allocative efficiency was questioned. In particular, the rising tax burden 
was seen as distorting resource allocation and as a drag on the economy (Lind and Granquist, 2010).  
 
The negative critique of the theories of the helping hand was complemented by a positive 
restatement of the wonders of the market. Market solutions were not only propagated as second 
best solutions when government failures exceed the market failures that led the government to 
intervene in the first place. The inherent efficiency of market mechanisms was reinstated. The need 
for wholesale macroeconomic policies was seen as limited because of the self-correcting 
mechanisms of the market. In addition, market-led alternatives to microeconomic regulation by 
politicians and bureaucrats, such as trade in pollution permits instead of administrative regulation, 
were developed. Neoliberal economic analysis also led to New Public Management that resulted in 
delegation of public service production and delivery to private contractors and special-purpose 
agencies, on the basis of contracts and incentive governance. This represents a totalization of 
market competition as a universal steering principle in the public sector. The neoliberal turn in 
economic theory led to re-establishing the boundaries between the market and the state and as 
such it implied new modes of coordinating economic and social life.  
 
 
The governance of the firm – from the visible hand to the vanishing hand 
 
Above, only two forms of coordination have been mentioned. The economic theoretical debates 
have concerned the boundaries and division of labour between the market and the state. This is 
indeed the main focus of coordination or governance within economic theory. However, also the 
role of corporate hierarchies has been covered in the economic theory of the firm. In economic 
theory, firms have traditionally been seen as profit maximizers. Apart from this function it was 
treated as a black box.  What goes on inside the firm was perceived as irrelevant. This has changed in 
the last 3-4 decades. 
 
The focus of economic theories on market relations between small producers and buyers who 
cannot influence prices corresponded relatively well with the economic reality until the late 19th 
Century. However, it became increasingly obvious that this theoretical emphasis was no longer a 
suitable representation of the emerging managerial capitalism dominated by big corporations. Berle 
and Means (1932) identified the separation between ownership and control as a crucial 
characteristic of managerial capitalism. Dispersed ownership associated with the concentration of 
power in the hands of top management is a defining characteristic of the managerial revolution. The 
most emphatic contribution to the literature on managerial capitalism was Chandler (1973) who 
argued that the visible hand of the modern managerial enterprise has replaced the invisible hand of 
the market in coordinating activities and allocating resources of the U.S. economy. The modern 
multi-unit business has replaced small traditional enterprise, because the volume of economic 
activities had reached a level that made administrative coordination more efficient than market 
coordination He argued that an increasingly powerful managerial hierarchy had been created for this 
multi-unit business enterprise. As the business enterprise grew in size and diversity and as its 
managers became more professional, the management of the enterprise became separated from its 
ownership. Managerial capitalism underscores the problem of controlling managers, who were 
shown to have a preference for growth and stability rather than maximization of shareholder profit. 
 
Managerial capitalism, dominated by big firms, prevailed until the 1970s. Since then, there has been 
an opposite trend. Administrative coordination by managerial hierarchies have been largely replaced 
by market relations but also by mechanisms such as horizontal networking and social capital akin to 
governance as defined in this book. Langlois (2002) has coined this process the vanishing hand.  A 
combination of technological and institutional changes has the effect of increasing the benefits of 
specialization and the division of labor relative to the costs of contracting, leading to vertical 
disintegration. Outsourcing and subcontracting have supplanted the vanishing administrative 
coordination by managerial hierarchies.  
 
The reasoning of Langlois is based on transaction cost theory which provides powerful tools for the 
analysis of the governance structure of firm transactions. This branch of economic theory is one of 
the few areas in economics where governance is explicitly analyzed (Williamson, 1996). According to 
Williamson, governance is “an exercise in assessing the efficacy of alternative modes (or means) of 
organization” (ibid, 11). The transaction is seen as the basic unit of analysis. Dependent on their 
attributes, transactions “are aligned with governance structures that differ in their cost and 
competence so as to effect a discriminating – mainly a transaction cost-economizing – result” (ibid, 
11). The most well-known application of transaction cost economics is as a means to decide the 
boundaries of the firm, i.e. which transactions to internalize (‘make’) and which to acquire in the 
market (‘buy’). The shifting boundaries of the firm over time reflect changes in the relative costs of 
performing a task through the corporate hierarchy versus the market.  
 
Transaction cost economics is explicitly about governance. However, there is an emphasis on a 
rather limited choice of organizational forms. Williamson recognizes the existence of other forms of 
governance but most often narrows down the perspective to a choice between market exchange 
and corporate hierarchy. He sees potential governance forms as being positioned on a spectrum 
with market and hierarchy in each end. However, he sees the spectrum as “thick in the tails”. 
Intermediate hybrid forms are seen as inherently inferior and unstable. For instance, Williamson 
(1975) explicitly dismisses the relevance of trust and networks as governance mechanisms. Although 
the theory is explicitly about governance it appears to exclude the relevance of mechanisms of 
governance that correspond with the more narrow definition of governance.  
 
 
The visible handshake 
 
Formal coordination through direct interaction between market actors, bureaucrats and politicians 
has been visible for a long time. However, it flourished, in particular, in the Golden Age of post-war 
capitalism until the 1980s. The phenomenon was linked to Keynesianism and more broadly the 
Fordist model of accumulation (Jessop, 1992). Economic interests were organized, and interest 
organizations seeked and were granted formal influence on public policy. Government-business links 
have always flourished. Whereas business influence on government policy has mostly been informal 
and indirect, it has also occasionally been formalized, for instance in delegation of authority to set 
standards and allocate public subsidies. Formal influence of organized business is stronger in 
Coordinated Market Economies than in Liberal Market Economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001).      
 
In many developed countries interest representation, which were previously pluralist, changed into 
corporatism, or neo-corporatism, where quasi-monopolies organizing major labour market and 
sectoral interest groups are granted formal rights to represent and make decisions on behalf of their 
members in joint decision making with other interest groups. Neo-corporatism favoured economic 
tripartism which involved strong labour unions, employers' unions, and governments that 
cooperated as "social partners" to negotiate and manage the national economy. Corporatist systems 
instituted in Europe post WW II include the ordoliberal system of the social market economy in 
Germany, the polder model in the Netherlands, and the Nordic model in Scandinavia. 
 
When Keynesianism ran into trouble with the emergence of stagflation in the 1970s, the 
predominant response in neo-corporatist countries were incomes policy and tripartist social pacts 
which are basically attempts to control the development of macroeconomic aggregates through 
agreements between organized interests. The failures of such policies and the ideological assault of 
neo-liberalism caused a gradual erosion of such grand-scale social engineering. However, formalized 
joint decision making still exists in many areas.  
 
Indicative planning is another type of visible handshake (Nielsen, 2007). Whereas central planning is 
the authoritative economic decision making by the state, other forms of planning consist of 
interactive processes and collective negotiations with private actors. When planning was popular in 
Western democracies in the 1960s and 1970s, this was the type of planning that took place. Non-
authoritative, non-directive planning by the state exists when it engages in activities intended to 
reduce risk and uncertainty for private actors. This may take the form of forecasting, investment 
planning and signalling intentions regarding future policies, and may be particularly effective when 
state owned enterprises constitute a significant share of the economy and/or when government 
procurement constitutes a significant and growing part of demand. It could even consist of 
comprehensive long-term (typically five-year) plans inspired by the central planning tradition. Such 
planning provides a framework for formation of less uncertain expectations about the future and 
does not necessarily include direct interaction. However, it is often coupled with interactive 
processes between the government and the major private economic actors with the purpose of 
informal coordination of public and private decision. This is what happened in France and other 
European countries where policy signalling, investment planning, and an institutionalized system of 
long-term planning was supplemented by consultation with organized interests and other major 
economic actors. The most iconic example of indicative planning is the post WWII experience of 
Japan. Here the guiding hand of the state was highly prominent and visible. The Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) effectively ran a comprehensive industrial policy, funding 
research, directing investment and influencing corporate strategies in accordance with long-term 
plans (Ihara, 1987).  
 
Most economists have struggled to make sense of visible handshakes which goes against key 
assumptions in economic theory. Market exchange is supposed to guarantee appropriate relative 
prices which are at best simulated but typically distorted by organized interests. And in case of 
market failure, the granting of formal influence to interested parties is seen to result in vested 
interest capture. However, some mainstream economists have contributed theories built on the 
rationale of visible handshakes. An example is the Rehn-Meidner model developed by two trade 
union economists which provides the rational for the use of selective employment policy measures, 
a tight macroeconomic policy and a wage policy of solidarity to combine full employment and equity 
with price stability and economic growth (Erixon, 2008).  
 
Outside of mainstream Economics there have been major contributions theorizing the rationale of 
visible handshakes. One of founders of the American tradition of institutional economics, John R. 
Commons, developed an analysis of collective action by the state and other institutions (Commons, 
1924). According to Commons, institutions were made up of collective actions that, along with 
conflict of interests, defined the economy.  A number of theories exploring the economic and 
political rationale of policy networks, bargaining, the negotiated economy and various hybrid forms 
of coordination were developed by political economists and political scientists in the 1980s and 
1990s (Kenis and Schneider, 1996). The most generic and influential contribution was Streeck and 
Schmitter (1985) who develops a typology with four models of social order. In addition to the 
market, the state (or the bureaucracy) and the community, they add interest governance, or the 
associative model of social order as a fourth model.   
 
The associative order includes informal as well the formalized aspects of cooperation, and most 
forms of formalized joint decision making are not only visible handshakes but invisible handshakes a 
swell. Whereas the analytical distinction is clear it is difficult in practice to distinguish the formal and 
informal parts of interactive processes. What is called the guiding hand in the next section is an 
example of this although it focuses of the ‘hand’ of the state in orchestrating and guiding the 
interaction.     
 
 
The invisible handshake 
 
The identification of invisible handshakes is not a straight-forward exercise. The concept is seldom 
used explicitly and the practices producing such agreements, social capital or consensus are informal 
and accordingly not immediately visible, yes, indeed invisible.  However, we will argue that such 
forms of governance are omnipresent and are becoming increasingly applied in a variety of contexts. 
Only a few examples are mentioned below. 
 
The concept has explicitly been used to characterize the development of organic relationships 
between producers and suppliers in the Japanese automotive parts industry. Smitka (1990s) shows 
how such relationships are formed partly by contractual means but mainly through social 
interaction. Networking built on trust develops into long-term strategic relationships that facilitate 
mutually beneficial management of interdependencies and strengthens incremental innovation. The 
argument has general relevance in many contexts with networks, partnerships and alliances. 
 
Many economic transactions take the form of a relational contract. The explicit terms of such a 
contract are just an outline as there are implicit terms and understanding which determine the 
behaviour of the parties. Relational contracts are relations rather than discrete transactions. 
Relational contract theory was originally developed by legal scholars (Macauley, 1963) but has been 
widely adopted in economic theory. The employment contract is the archetypical relational contract 
but the phenomenon exists in many markets and in a wide range of economic relationships.  
Economic theory tends to focus on the incentive structure in such relationships (Gibbons and 
Roberts, 2013). However, the incompleteness of contracts necessitates negotiation, and, often, 
relational contracts are based upon relationships of trust. 
 
The burgeoning literature on trust (Nooteboom, 2002) and social capital (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 
2004) provides evidence that some forms and some dimensions of invisible handshakes are analysed 
extensively by economists although many mainstream economists have still problems with the use 
and status of such concepts (Solow, 2001). The analysis of the non-profit social economy, or the 
third sector, is another field where economic theory has been applied. However, the mainstream 
approach gives priority to only certain dimensions of third sector activity (Westall, 2009). 
 
Douglass North and other institutional economists have stressed the role of mental models and 
ideologies in economic exchange (Denzau and North, 1994; North, 2005). Decision making is framed 
by social processes forming the mental models of the actors. However, apart from a few such 
contributions the discursive dimension of economic exchange is largely neglected by economic 
theory. The presumption of given preferences still permeate economic theory. It is in a sense 
peculiar that this dimension of visible handshakes is not given more attention in economics 
considering the fact that much application of economic theory is embedded in efforts to influence 
the way major economic actors and the public at large understand and interpret the economic 
reality.  
 
 
Common pool resources - a case of visible and invisible handshake 
 
The invisible hand indicates the existence of hidden mechanisms that automatically translate self-
interested individual behaviour into socially optimal results. However, economic theory identifies 
many situations where rational behaviour by individuals leads to irrational societal outcomes. The 
classical market failures and macroeconomic imbalances represent only some of those situations 
(Barry and Hardin, 1982). Perhaps most significantly, game theory addresses problems such as the 
prisoner’s dilemma where isolated rational decisions by individuals lead to suboptimal outcomes. In 
such interaction contexts an appropriate institutional framework for strategic interaction between 
isolated market actors is required according to economic theory. In practice, interaction dilemmas 
are often solved through collective action and social mechanisms such as trust, social norms, culture 
and tradition.  
 
Economic theory identifies problems with collective action, in principle. Olson (1965) shows that 
concentrated minor interests will be overrepresented and diffuse major interests neglected in 
situations of concentrated benefits and diffuse costs. He argues that free riding is a rational choice 
for individuals in cases where joint action is beneficial for the group as such which means that 
collective action is only possible in situations with significant benefits for small groups, coercion or 
fringe benefits unrelated to the purpose of the action itself. The consequence is that small producer 
interests will be overrepresented whereas broad consumer or tax payer interests are 
underrepresented.  
   
Collective action problems are particularly acute in relation to common pool resources such as 
pastures, forests, water, fishing grounds, irrigation systems and the atmosphere where usage 
generally cannot be restricted.  Such resources tend to degrade because of excessive use. This is the 
so-called ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968). As far as remedies are concerned, economists 
have traditionally recommended either public ownerships or the establishment of individual 
property right to common pool resources. This follows the usual practice of solving interaction 
problems through either government intervention or market exchange. However, this is often 
impractical and impossible. Based on in-depth empirical studies of the management of common pool 
resource in various contexts, Ostrom (1990, 2000) points to a ‘third way’ that relies neither on 
central planning nor on individual property and markets. Her evidence suggests that many successful 
common-pool management systems are “rich mixtures of ‘private-like’ and ‘public-like’ institutions 
defying classification into a sterile dichotomy” (Ostrom, 1990, 14). She emphasizes the crucial role of 
trust and culture, arguing that that the assumption of ubiquitous opportunism leading to free riding, 
does not reflect the actual practices of managing common pool resources where trust and other 
social mechanisms substitute or complement costly monitoring to ensure compliance with the 
collectively negotiated rules of governance. Ostrom shows how collective action problems are solved 
through various forms of social interaction and negotiations. Through the conceptual prism of this 
article these processes constitute a combination of visible and invisible handshakes. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Economic theory has much to contribute and is highly influential in relation to the overall social 
coordination of different modes of governance. This has typically provided the rationale for 
allocating specific tasks to either the market or (corporate or governmental) hierarchies. The 
interaction processes in focus are the inherent processes of market competition and exchange, and 
hierarchic decision making in either firms or the state. It is still unusual among mainstream 
economists to pay attention to interactive processes that go beyond the specific modes of 
interaction characteristic of either markets (voluntary exchange) or hierarchies (command). 
However, some contributions, in particular from outside the mainstream provide valuable insight 
about interactive governance. The emergence and growth of new forms of governance characterized 
by interactive, negotiated processes of steering is a challenge for economic theory. Some of the 
paradigmatic assumptions in mainstream economics make it difficult to grasp the inherent 
rationality of this reality in full. Relaxation of the assumptions of given preferences and given 
institutions is a necessary precondition for a profound understanding of these phenomena.  It is 
crucial to recognize fully how formal and informal institutions (North, 1985) shape decision making. 
In addition, the importance of discourse and informal forms of cooperation must be acknowledged 
and it must be better understood how the integration of economic and social forms of interaction 
shape preferences and decisions. More fundamentally, however, a proper understanding of the new 
forms of governance may require a substitution of the assumption of maximization with balancing of 
interests and concerns in an Aristotelian spirit (van Staveren, 2001) but this would constitute a 
complete paradigm shift.  
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